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1 RESEARCH TOPIC 
1.1 Introduction  
 
An offshore financial center (OFC) can’t be defined through a single characteristic but it 
involves a sum of aspects: starting from a primarly orientation of business towards 
nonresidents, a favorable regulatory environment, a low or zero taxation scheme but 
also a disproportion between the size of the financial sector and the domestic needs, 
the dealing in currencies that are not the currency of the country where the center is 
located, the fact of being a center separeted from major regulating units (states) and 
last but not least the offshore banking activities are essentially an entrepot business. 
 
Basically there are four essential uses for OFCs locations. To start with, they are utilized 
by those wishing to avoid or dodge their commitment to pay taxes. Tax avoidance is 
legal, however outside the soul of tax assessment law, while tax evasion is dependably 
an illegal action including the non-exposure of a financial gain to a fiscal authority that 
has a lawful right to be informed about it.  
 
Second, they are utilized to conceal criminal exercises from view. That criminal action 
may be tax evasion itself, however may likewise be money laundering or wrongdoings 
producing money that should be cleaned up like burglary, extortion, defilement, insider 
trading, robbery, financing of terrorism, drugs dealing, human trafficking, frauds, 
kidnapping and blackmailing.  
 
Third, they are utilized by the individuals who need their exercises to be unknown, 
regardless of the possibility that they are totally within the legitimate borders. A few 
people wish to conceal their wealth from their partners, for instance; others might need 
to hide businesses which, however legal, may ruin their public image.  
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Fourth, they are utilized by those looking for some place less expensive to do business; 
in these areas they can often keep away from the exorbitant commitment and expenses 
connected to regulations and laws that would be applied if the exchange were 
attempted on onshore territories. 
 
Offshore finance is a significant theme since it is a sector that has expanded extensively 
since the 1970s and it has became of common interest lately thanks to new sources of 
information in the matter like Panama Papers and LuxLeaks, that will both be used later 
on in this thesis. Anyway for the lion's share of banks and an increasing number of 
organizations, the utilization of offshore jurisdictions has a tendency to be the habit 
instead of the special case. Offshore economies are not just huge on account of their 
size; they exemplify a parallel arrangement of economic principles utilized by business 
and financial elites to dodge rules on money related laws and the ripartition of capitals. 
 
1.2 Research aim 
 
This thesis is revolving around two main research aims: the first is to synthetize the ser-
vices offered by the main OFCs and the financial consequences that are generated from 
them. The second instead, is to investigate the relationship between the European Un-
ion and the offshore finance phenomenon. 
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1.3 Research questions 
 
The research questions of the thesis are two as the aims, the first is: what are the ser-
vices offered by the main OFCs and what kind of financial impact they have on the 
world? The second instead: what is the role played by the European Union in the off-
shore finance phenomenon? 
1.4 Demarcation  
 
The scope of the research is to understand the world of the OFCs and the role that the 
European Union has in it. The research includes an overview of which are the main tax 
havens, the locations and main features of the top four, according to the Panama Pa-
pers, but without getting into details in the other ones. It will face the topic of which are 
the services offered by OFCs to private individuals and corporations. It will also give an 
insight into info and data about the size of financial flows going from and through OFCs 
even if limited to what is available in the current academic literature and to the esti-
mates made by professional and experts of the subject.  
 
This paper has also a focus on the level of involvement of the EU in the offshore business 
and it analyses aspects such as: the advance tax ruling practices, the level of intermedi-
ation established toward OFCs, the amount of European wealth held offshore and the 
capital flows related, but also how some European countries can be considered OFCs 
based on the concept of “conduit” jurisdiction. The thesis offers a general outline on EU 
countries policy making related to OFCs, not getting too deep into each EU country spe-
cific regulation, instead being more a summary of the mutual aspects shared by onshore 
EU countries or general attitude towards the industry.  
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2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1  Material 
 
The elements of the research that provided the data that I analyzed are mainly academic 
textbooks for the basic concepts that are supporting my explanations and the further 
information; the secondary data sources (due to the topic collecting primary data would 
be almost impossible for me) are mainly academic publications, financial and economic 
journals, statistical data and the leaking material like the Panama Papers and the Lux 
Leaks in order to get numerical attainments; EU institutional papers, IMF reports, ECB 
papers and other thesis involving the same or a similar topic to get legal, political and 
overview information. 
 
2.2  Approach 
 
The approach that it is used to answer the research questions is a descriptive desktop 
research with analytical and numerical foundations of pre-existing statistics, estimates 
and academic studies. The thesis is not based on a field research or on primary data this 
because it resulted to be impossible as a private individual due to the specific matter of 
the thesis. The innate nature of offshore finance pushes towards the use of pre-existing 
leaks of information or on estimates and values put together by influential institutions 
or professionals in the field.  
 
The possible problems and bias regarding this approach are to be connected with the 
scarcity of reliable data on the topic. For example, the leaks from a single company like 
Mossack Fonseca (Panama Papers) can´t be an accurate representation of the whole 
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panorama of firms worldwide working in the offshore finance field. But also in overall 
the total secrecy, in fact Murphy (2011) states that “an offshore company owned by an 
offshore trust creates an almost impermeable barrier to inquiry”, and non-cooperative 
status of some jurisdictions forces professionals to make estimates based on little infor-
mation, increasing so the risk of inaccuracy of the output. Even considering these issues, 
the approach selected is to be regarded as the best possible since there are no other 
legal and reasonable ways of obtaining data on offshore finance.  
 
2.3  Data collection 
 
All the data comes from secondary sources so they aren’t collected personally, as ex-
plained in the previous paragraph. Consequently, there was no way of influencing what 
kind of instruments, methods and procedures have been used in the collection. For the 
same reasons the data analysis techniques don´t appear to be relevant as no quantita-
tive data are involved. The main duty was to choose trustworthy and reliable data from 
relevant academic or institutional sources that are exactly related to be subject investi-
gated in the research questions. 
 
3 REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH 
Various researches have been produced and shared regarding the field of this thesis.  
Both on the OFCs world financial flows aspect and on the European Union role on it the 
academic community has been prolific, even if a lot of info and data is coming from the 
financial industry itself or from institutions like the EU or the OECD. The following part 
gives a brief overview of both aspects in the overlying order, with the aim of giving the 
reader a support in better understanding the following parts of the paper. 
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Regarding the type of services and financial flows generated by offshore jurisdictions 
there are strongly contrasting opinions. Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux (2010) clarify 
that while, individually tax havens may appear insignificant, together they strongly af-
fect the world´s economy. They also claim that tax havens are fundamental to the global 
economy, they don´t just operate at their margins. OFCs are a vital part of the financial 
industry, especially the wealth management and investment sectors, not only conduits 
for tax avoidance and evasion.  
 
 
Zhixiang (2008) on the other hand focuses more on the type of activities rather than the 
volume of financial flows. He finds a strong difference between OFCs and money laun-
dering centers, even if sometimes the two collide, since the first attract more asset in-
vestment but on the other hand, the second scares potential investors away. This has 
evidence in a higher value of financial intermediation in OFCs and a lower one in the 
money laundering centers. The paper shows that the role of offshore havens in facilitat-
ing illegal activities has been overestimated in the previous studies. In addition, it claims 
that the competitive advantages in the matter have been reducing in the recent years 
due to global action against it. 
 
 
Other authors like Henry (2012) are more number and data oriented, giving an outlook 
of the offshore economy as “large enough to have a major impact on estimates of ine-
quality of wealth and income; on estimates of national income and debt ratios; and most 
importantly to have very significant negative impacts on the domestic tax bases of key 
source countries”, giving so a clear idea of the size of the phenomenon. The economist 
claims the results proposed to be only related to the financial wealth since all the other 
sources and forms of wealth are impossible to quantify. 
 
 
Early research focused on the implications of the European Union in the offshore finance 
shows quite concurring opinions. For example, according to Palan (2012) the EU has a 
great degree of involvement in the OFCs world, and his conclusions are based on the 
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data from the Bank for International Settlements (2010). He argues that more than half 
of all international assets and liabilities are to be connected to EU countries or jurisdic-
tions related to it. 
 
 
Also Mügge (2013) considers the EU to be highly involved in the OFCs world, to a point 
where he argues it is the biggest player worldwide even considering the policy efforts 
implemented to control and avoid its negative sides. He identifies the root of the prob-
lem in different strategies from different EU countries and in the way the EU is struc-
tured and functioning. 
 
 
Zucman (2013) proposes a very interesting concept according to which the western 
world does not really have a negative net foreign asset position, but that this deception 
is simply caused by tax havens. Based on his assumptions this discovery “turns the Euro-
zone, officially the world’s second largest net debtor, into a net creditor”, underlining so 
the massive size of the European wealth held offshore. 
 
 
Fernandez (2015) while trying to address the issue of shadow banking in Europe, and in 
particular securitization, widely calls multiple EU countries OFCs based on the concept 
of conduit jurisdiction. The same word is used by Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Heemskerk 
and Takes (2017) whose work basically demonstrate the active and main role of the EU 
in the offshore environment by using a data-driven approach. 
 
 
Therefore, from the previous literature appears that the EU is strongly involved in the 
world of OFCs in multiple ways, both as a provider of offshore finance services and as 
the source of extremely big amounts of wealth stored in other OFCs. 
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4 THE MAIN OFCS AND THEIR LOCATIONS 
 
Since there are so many OFCs and they are spread out all around the world, it might be 
sometimes difficult to know exactly which one of them are the most important in terms 
of business volume and where to locate them in a map. 
 
Based on the Panama Papers, out of the companies that appear in Mossack Fonseca´s 
leaks almost half of the companies, more than 113000, were incorporated in the British 
Virgin Islands. Instead the actual HQs location of the firm, Panama, was only second in 
the list (ICIJ 2016). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The 10 most popular tax havens in the Panama Papers, Source: The Panama 
Papers 
 
 
In this part of the thesis the author is going to describe more in depth the four jurisdic-
tions that according to the Panama Papers that had more incorporations occurring 
within their financial sector. 
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4.1 The British Virgin Islands 
The British Virgin Islands are one of the best and most respected financial sectors not 
only in the Caribbean (they are located to the east of Puerto Rico), but on a global scale. 
Apart from being a modern and efficient banking system, it is also a country where the 
government has placed considerable focus on developing strict money laundering and 
tax evasion laws. Thanks to this attitude towards transparency they earned an amazing 
reputation in the financial community and even a spot on the OECD’s white list. Since 
2004, when the BVI Business Companies Act has been adopted, more than half a million 
firms have been incorporated on the island (Wolters Kluver 2016). 
4.2 Panama 
Secrecy and position, its nearness both to the homonym Canal and to the USA, are the 
key that sealed the success of Panama among international tax havens. The Latin juris-
diction remains a "black hole" because it does not participate in the agreements for the 
exchange of tax information, although it has recently expressed its intention to improve, 
it has a similarity to the Swiss legislation, which punishes violation of banking and finan-
cial secrecy (IlSole24Ore 2016). 
 
Significant progress has been made to strengthen financial integrity, the authorities 
have adopted several legislative reforms to address weaknesses in the framework for 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. But there is the need 
to continue to energetically enhance the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime, particu-
larly on issues of tax transparency (IMF 2016). 
 
4.3 Bahamas 
This country made of small islands is located in the Atlantic Ocean north of Cuba and 
southeast of the US state of Florida. It was the first nation in the Caribbean with a IOSCO 
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A status (“signifying the highest level of compliance with international standards for the 
jurisdiction’s securities regime”) that was obtained after reaching the Signatory A status 
under the MMoU (“an international benchmark for cross-border co-operation […] pro-
vided securities regulators with the tools for combating cross-border fraud and miscon-
duct that can weaken global markets and undermine investor confidence”). In addition, 
the country can offer complete anonymity and confidentiality to investors, exemption 
from local taxes and stamp duties, ease of company incorporation and the minimum 
requirement of just one shareholder and one director (Wolters Kluver 2016).  
 
4.4 Seychelles 
The group of islands has risen as an undeniably prominent OFC and its turning point was 
the boost in the 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union. Seychelles, which is located is 
an archipelago  in the Indian Ocean, east of mainland East Africa nearby Madagascar, is 
basically in the same time zone as most of the Eastern Europe, was a popular choice 
among the soviet elite that wanted to move capital outside the region (Sharman 2011).  
 
The jurisdiction is strong on mutual and hedge funds, which can be created as a society, 
a global trust or a limited partnership. A key aspect that supported the country in be-
coming a relevant OFC is the position on bank secrecy. The info of people related to 
accounts or funds are not publicly disclosed. Furthermore, a Seychelles based interna-
tional company profits of favorable starting-up expenses, the lack of local duties and no 
exposure of the minimum capital. It might seem that Seychelles haven't been doing 
what's necessary to fight money laundering. Anyway, they have expressed the will to 
change by attempting to enhance its legal and fiscal structure (Wolters Kluver 2016). 
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5 SERVICES AND LEGAL FORMS IN THE OFCS 
 
The OFCs offer many different types of services and legal forms that attract investors in 
moving their capitals and businesses in one of the jurisdiction providing them. Different 
ones will of course be of interest to different investors according to their needs. Due to 
the very wide range of services offered by offshore jurisdictions, the thesis will focus in 
the next part simply on the main ones or the main categories, giving an explanation 
about what they consist of, what they are used for and other relevant aspects. 
5.1 Limited liability vehicles 
 
There are mainly two types of limited liability vehicles used in the OFCs: 
1. International Business Companies (IBCs) that basically are corporations formed 
under the corporate legislation of a tax haven (such as Bahamas, Panama, Turks 
& Caicos). IBCs are not authorized to do business in the country of formation 
(incorporation) but can have offices that manage global operations. 
 
2. Limited Liability Companies (LLC) that are “a business structure allowed by state 
statute. Each state may use different regulations […] Owners of an LLC are 
called members. Most states do not restrict ownership, and so members may 
include individuals, corporations, other LLCs and foreign entities. There is no 
maximum number of members. Most states also permit “single-member” LLCs, 
those having only one owner” (IRS 2017). 
 
 
5.2 Tax planning for companies and individuals 
 
OFCs are additionally destinations for the organizations and individuals interested in tax 
planning. In fact, offshore jurisdictions offer structures that permit to camouflage the 
ownership and to stay away from property, inheritance or capital gain taxes, all within 
the law. In addition, the creditor’s claims in the event of default are limited when an 
organization is located in the OFC. 
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There is another possible reason for the usage of OFCs regarding asset management 
matters, a situation when “wealthy individuals and enterprises in countries with weak 
economies and fragile banking systems may want to keep assets overseas to protect 
them against the collapse of their domestic currencies and domestic banks, and outside 
the reach of existing or potential exchange controls. If these individuals also seek confi-
dentiality, then an account in an OFC is often the vehicle of choice” as stated by FSF’s 
Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers Report (2000). 
 
5.3 Trusts and foundations 
There are certain legal forms used to protect the ownership, two of the most important 
are trust and foundations. Trust in general is a relation between two individuals con-
cerning ownership management. Trusts cannot be considered as companies, they can’t 
be sold or bought. The IRS states that “a trust is a relationship in which one per-
son holds title to property, subject to an obligation to keep or use the property for the 
benefit of another” (IRS 2016). Instead foundations have a bit different meaning in an 
offshore context compared to an onshore context as they are used mainly for estate 
planning purposes. Quoting McCann “although a foundation is a distinct legal entity, it 
has no shareholders and it is administered in accordance with contractual principles – 
not fiduciary principles. […] A founder may be a real person or a corporation or a trust 
[…] that endows the foundation with assets, and it is then called ‘the patrimony’. Foun-
dations may hold assets in their own name, for the purposes described in the constitutive 
documents. The founder is not the legal owner of the assets, and it is this separation 
which protects assets from potential creditors.” 
5.4  Banks and insurances 
Most of the most important banking institutions have their HQs or if nothing else their 
branches in an OFC providing also the typical services. For example, on Cayman Islands, 
one of the main jurisdictions in the Caribbean, there are “over 40 of the top 50 banks 
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holding licenses here” (Cayman Islands Monetary Authority 2017). There are many rea-
sons why it is attractive to banks and insurance companies to be offshore: obviously 
there are huge advantages due to no or low corporate tax, but also capital gains tax, 
withholding tax on dividends or interest.  
 
Usually anyway the most relevant factor for the banking and insurance industry is the 
regulatory environment, as OFCs are usually way more lenient compared to onshore 
jurisdictions. This is attitude is also often the same regarding supervision and reporting. 
Finally, offshore banks are as limited as if they would be onshore concerning trading. 
 
Regarding insurance companies usually MNCs establish them in OFCs in order to protect 
against risk within their group or holding. Basically, the concept is that an onshore insur-
ance company establishes a subsidiary in an OFC to reinsure certain risks underwritten 
by the parent and to reduce overall reserve and capital requirements, with also the goal 
to reinsure against catastrophic risks (Financial Stability Forum, 2000). 
5.5  Investment funds 
This type of services can vary considerably considering the different sub-categories but 
in overall “an investment fund is a supply of capital belonging to numerous investors 
used to collectively purchase securities while each investor retains ownership and control 
of his own shares. An investment fund provides a broader selection of investment oppor-
tunities, greater management expertise and lower investment fees than investors might 
be able to obtain on their own” (Investopedia 2017). 
 
Regarding collective investment schemes the OFCs are preferred because of their low 
or non-existent income tax. In the table below, there are the top five countries in the 
Euro Area according to their amount of assets and the percentage of the total assets 
held by investment funds in the Euro Area in the year 2016: 
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 Euro Area Member States  
Aggregated B/S Investment Funds EUR Billions December ‘16 
Country Total Assets % of tot € area 
LU 3804,6 34,27% 
IE 1938,4 17,46% 
FR 1356,6 12,22% 
DE 2046,2 18,43% 
NL 830,80 7,48% 
Table 1. The 5 most relevant countries in the Euro area according to their number of 
assets held by investment funds, Source: European Central Bank 2016 
 
It can clearly be noticed how Luxembourg even if it is one of the smallest countries in 
the Euro Area it is by far the biggest player in the investment funds industry, accounting 
for more than one third of the whole area. It is worth mentioning also the very relevant 
role of Ireland, which as Luxembourg is one of the offshore jurisdictions part of the EU. 
5.6  Ships registration 
Another important line of business for some OFCs is the ship registration.  
As an example, “about 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison, the US has 
around 3,400 registered vessels and China just over 3,700” (BBC 2014). By law the coun-
try under whom flag is the ship cruising must practice the administrative control over it. 
Some of the OFCs have very favorable legal and fiscal environments for ship registration 
and that’s why they are so frequently used for this kind of operations. The international 
infrastructure of the OFCs is organized for non-residents and that is the motivation be-
hind why such a hefty portion of them offers this kind of services. This is particularly 
common for example in Panama as mentioned before, but also in Liberia, Cayman Is-
lands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Malta, Bahamas, and some others. 
 
19 
 
5.7 Other services and products 
Apart from the services mentioned in the overlaying part, many OFCs offer also general 
corporate services, provision of directors, company secretarial services, movies, IT, es-
tate planning and stock brokerage. Of course, an individual or a company will find a 
wider or smaller offer of these depending on the jurisdiction selected. 
 
6 THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON WORLD’S ECONOMY 
 
The presence and size of OFCs have different effects. First of all, tax havens that are 
utilized for tax avoidance and tax evasion obviusly correspond to decreased tax income 
for the onshore nations. There is little information about the amount of cash diverted 
thorugh OFCs. Since 2003 when, as indicated by Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux (2010), 
not by any means real data on these activities were accessible, reaserchers have 
embraced different ways to deal with in order to get solid figures (Zucman, 2014; Henry, 
2012; Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010).  
 
The loss generated by tax evasion and avoidance of enterprises is evaluated to be 
between 2% to 2,5% of the world’s GDP (Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010). Those 
percentages can be translate into a yearly loss of 270 to 335 billion dollars in the 
European union. James Henry (2012) computed that up to 32 trillion dollars (around 26 
trillion euros) of unreported private money  was held offshore toward the end of 2010 
by extremly wealthy people. These figures just incorporate financial wealth and hence 
avoid lands, yachts and other non-monetary resources. Zucman (2013) assessed that 8% 
of the private financial wealth (around 5,8 trillion dollars) of rich people is being buried 
in OFCs, prompting a yearly expense loss of 130 billion euros under the supposition that 
75% of the amounts is untaxed.  
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As huge as it may seem, the figures just allude to private financial wealth, but the unpaid 
tax revenue generated by MNCs are excluded. As indicated by Troost (2013) the tax 
losses that are experienced thorugh the tax avoidance methodologies of MNCs are 
twenty times higher than those connected with duty avoidance of well off individuals. 
More than 80% of the 100 biggest pubblic traded US companies have subsidiaries in 
OFCs (GAO, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 1. The estimated amount in offshore financial assets in trillion U.S. dollars from 
2002 to 2010, Source: statista.com 
 
7 EU POLICIES AND ATTITUDE 
 
The taxing power is one of the pillars of the sovereignty of the Member States Union, 
which in fact have given only limited powers to the Union. The development of tax pro-
visions at EU level aims at a correct functioning of the single market. In an initial phase, 
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it begun with the harmonization of indirect taxes in more depth than they did for direct 
taxes. 
 
This because EU’s power to create and implement fiscal policies has always been re-
duced to indirect taxes such as VAT and excise duties. The fundamental issue is that any 
maneuver regarding direct taxes requires unanimity at the Council of Ministers, basically 
being a revision of the treaties. Considering these aspects and adding others like the fact 
that the single currency gives total stability to the exchange rates in the internal market, 
but also that the four freedoms that generated a marketplace where individuals and 
companies can shop around or that the presence of a strong collective action problem 
is undeniable, the EU is hardly expected to succeed in its fight against cross-border tax 
avoidance and evasion (Mügge, 2014).  
 
Regarding also the political stand point Mügge (2014) states that “the EU contains within 
it multiple and opposed interests; many of its member states follow an offshore strategy, 
making the EU itself the host to the largest tax evasion industry in the world. If we include 
EU member state dependencies such as the former Dutch Antilles and the UK Channel 
Islands, Bermuda, and the Caymans, the EU hosts approximately 60 per cent of the 
world's tax havens”. 
 
Discrepancies between tax regimes of different countries allow certain companies to 
implement an "aggressive tax planning" to minimize their tax burden. The aim of the 
close coordination and exchange of information between tax administrations is to avoid 
this happening. The governments of the European countries should also ensure that 
their systems of taxation on corporate income are transparent and equitable, and not 
structured to attract undue companies from other EU countries or at least erode the tax 
base. Therefore, they signed a Code of Conduct that invites you to avoid it. 
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Anyway, the fight against tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning is a key challenge. 
Increased cooperation, coordination and transparency between the EU Member States 
in the matter of tax policies would help in reducing significant tax losses incurred by the 
Member States and to ensure greater fairness across the EU. In addition to the progress 
already achieved and ongoing activities, the Commission proposed a series of new initi-
atives contained in a notice published in June 2016. The Commission will try this year to 
revive its proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base for companies and to 
prepare, by the end of 2017, an EU list of tax havens or the so called “EU list of non-
cooperative tax jurisdictions” (KPMG 2016). 
 
About the topic Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Tax-
ation and Customs stated that "The EU takes its international tax good governance com-
mitments seriously. It is reasonable for us to expect the same from our international 
partners. We want to have fair and open discussions with our partners on tax issues that 
concern us all in the global community. The EU list will be our tool to deal with third 
countries that refuse to play fair." 
 
On the other hand, it might be argued that the blacklists have become a tool to divert 
the attention from jurisdictions that would have tax haven features like for example, 
focusing just inside the European Union, the UK and its dependencies and overseas ter-
ritories, the Netherlands, Ireland and others (Gravelle 2013). 
 
7.1 Consequences of the policies 
The EU’s most relevant tax policy concerning the OFCs world is the 2005 Tax and Savings 
Directive, that for the first time forced cooperative jurisdictions to tax or report the in-
come deriving from interest earned by EU residents (or whose beneficial owner is). This 
kind of regulation left open space to non-EU residents and companies, or suggested as 
a solution also the possibility of moving the entity to a non-cooperative jurisdiction. 
Based on a data from two leaks that took place in 2013 it is clear how, immediately after 
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the implementation of the Directive, the growth of EU-owned entities declined while 
the one of the non-EU-owned entities remained stable. The leaks highlighted a replace-
ment of EU ownership with non-EU ownership and of cooperative jurisdictions with non-
cooperative ones (P.Caruana-Galizia & M.Caruana-Galizia, 2016). 
 
This phenomenon proves how fast the market reacts and finds a solution to any policy 
change regarding offshore finance and how the EU finds difficulties in implementing ef-
ficient and hard to elude measures. There is a need of more comprehensive policies that 
would regulate in a more productive way the subject. On the other hand, the last decade 
of tax and financial regulations deprived tax havens of some of their attractive assets 
and four former OFCs have permanently closed: Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands and 
Tonga (Hampton and Christensen, 2011). 
 
8 EU’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE OFFSHORE WORLD 
8.1 Advance tax ruling 
 
Tax ruling is a general term used for any kind of arrangement between the tax authori-
ties and an individual or a company but for this thesis is more interesting the concept of 
advance tax ruling since it is a behavior that could be theoretically connected to OFCs 
but that happens widely also within the EU. Basically, the difference is that “an advance 
tax ruling is a statement provided by the tax authorities, or an independent council, re-
garding the tax treatment of a taxpayer with respect to his future transactions and on 
which he is – to a certain extent – entitled to rely” (European Parliament 2015). Based 
on it multinationals (with subsidiaries in several countries) choose the most advanta-
geous destination from a fiscal point of view. 
 
The problem is that the secret tax agreements signed by the European Union countries 
with multinational companies are growing exponentially. The report "Survival of the 
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Richest" (Eurodad, 2016), which uses the data provided by the EU Commission, found 
out that starting from the 547 tax-ruling signed in 2013, the number grew to 972 in 2014, 
reaching 1,444 in the Union at the end of 2015. The report conducted a comparative 
analysis on the progress regarding specific tax justice measures in 18 European coun-
tries. The analysis shows an overall increase of over 160% in just two years (2013-2015) 
and an increase of almost 50% from 2014 to 2015. 
 
Sifting through the member countries, it is clear that Luxembourg, even after Lux Leaks 
scandal, has not changed direction and remained at the top of the standings having 
granted 172 other multinational secret agreements. Even Belgium is at the top of the EU 
countries with the highest number of tax-ruling into force at the end of 2015 according 
to the Commission's accounting model. According to the report of the NGO the tendency 
does not seem to have been the least tarnished by the Lux Leak scandal detonated in 
November 2014. 
 
Since the agreements are secret between companies and tax authorities the public can-
not know their content. However, the study points out that the Lux Leaks scandal and 
the investigation of cases of aid was conducted by the Commission with some sensa-
tional decisions already made public, like for example the decision in the case of the Irish 
ruling in favor of Apple group in August 2016 gave clear evidence of how these agree-
ments allow corporations to obtain favorable tax treatment, as well as a real competitive 
advantage compared to small and medium-sized domestic enterprises (IlSole24Ore 
2016). 
 
8.2 Intermediation in the EU countries 
A relevant issue is not only tax ruling and having a common policy as European Union 
regarding offshore jurisdictions, but also the intermediation made from EU countries to 
OFCs should be taken into consideration as a key factor. 
25 
 
 
As appeared from the Panama Papers, Mossack Fonseca worked with intermediaries in 
more than 100 countries all around the world, also in the EU. Their most active clients 
by number of offshore company incorporations were from Hong Kong and Switzerland, 
but also the United Kingdom (that should still be considered part of the EU since Brexit 
hasn’t been implemented yet), Luxembourg and Cyprus (ICIJ 2016). 
 
This places three EU countries in the list of the jurisdictions with the most active inter-
mediaries, as can be seen from the following chart:  
 
Figure 3. The 10 most active intermediaries per country in the Panama Papers, Source: 
The Panama Papers 
 
 
The very high number of incorporations attributed to the UK can easily be explained by 
referring to an indicator such as "offshore intensity" that is basically the foreign finan-
cial assets divided by the GDP of the jurisdiction. This ratio intuitively shows how inten-
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
MOST ACTIVE INTERMEDIARIES PER 
COUNTRY
Number of incorporations
26 
 
sively the country acts as an OFC and concerning the year 2011 the top ten of is domi-
nated by jurisdictions that are under the sovereignty of the UK or that are (formally in-
dependent) Commonwealth realms (Fichtner 2011). 
 
 
The same highlighting of the role of some countries is expressed also by Fernandez 
(2015) that referring to the size of the other financial institution sector in the EU claims 
it is “disproportionately concentrated in the UK (29%), Luxembourg (17%), the Nether-
lands (15%) and Ireland (8%). The largest economies of the Eurozone, Germany (7%), 
France (7%), and Italy (4%) are small players”. 
 
Also Palan (2012) in the matter of international capitals focuses on the same countries 
by identifying two agglomerations of OFCs: the British Imperial pole (London, British 
Crown dependencies, British Overseas Territories and recently independent colonies) 
accounting for 38,3% and the Mid-size European pole (Benelux countries, Ireland and 
Switzerland) accounting for 14,9%. Basically, in March 2010 the 53,3% (that was 58,4% 
the previous year) of all international assets and liabilities are to be connected to EU 
countries or jurisdictions related to it, giving an even stronger image if compared to the 
14,9% of the USA. 
 
8.3 Capital flows from the EU to the OFCs 
In nowadays world it is quite normal having capitals flowing across borders of different 
countries and continents, so being the OFCs one of the main players in this phenome-
non. In order to give a clearer overview of the situation, the following table shows the 
holdings, in percentage, of the Euro Area residents in jurisdictions outside the Euro Area 
according to the European Commission: 
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 FDI Assets FDI Liabilities Port. Equity 
Assets 
Port. Debt 
Assets 
Other Assets Other liabili-
ties 
Other Europe 37,1 38,3 26,1 39,8 49,6 54,2 
North Amer-
ica 
22,8 26 34,8 34,8 16,2 14,4 
China 1,5 0,3 2,9 0,1 0,9 1,2 
Japan 1,3 2,2 5,3 3,8 2,0 1,7 
Offshore Fi-
nancial Cen-
ters 
8,8 14,4 12,7 5,5 10,4 11,5 
Rest of the 
world 
28,5 18,8 18,3 15,9 20,9 17,1 
 
Table 3. Extra-Area Holdings of Euro Area Residents: Per cent of Total Holdings, Source: 
European Commission 2013 
 
It can easily be noticed that the OFCs, even being fiscally small countries, are one of 
the main players, with way larger percentages than bigger and more industrially devel-
oped markets such as China and Japan. This can definitely showcase the high level of 
involvement of the EU countries in practices linked to offshore jurisdictions. 
 
8.4 The difference between “sink” and “conduit” OFC 
If the whole idea of OFC is based on the findings of the Panama Papers, it might be 
easily understood by the reader that these jurisdictions are small island tax havens ra-
ther than large and economically relevant countries. But a new data-driven approach 
for identifying OFCs based on the global corporate ownership network, in which over 
40 million firms (nodes) are connected through 71 million ownership relations (lines), 
has just been developed by Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Heemskerk and Takes (Euro-
pean Parliament 2017). 
 
This concept is based on the difference between “sink” OFCs and “conduit” OFCs: the 
first ones “attract and retain foreign capital”, instead the second ones are “attractive 
intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments and enable the 
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transfer of capital without taxation” (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Heemskerk and Takes 
2017). 
 
 
In this work 23 jurisdictions are identified as sink OFCs and 5 as conduit OFCs. The lat-
ter ones “canalize the majority of corporate offshore investment” and they are the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland and Singapore.  
This underlines that 4 out 5 of the main players are on European soil and 3 out of 5 are 
part of the EU (counting the UK since Brexit hasn’t been implemented yet). 
These countries facilitate the transfer of value from and to sink OFCs and because of 
these their services are used by companies and individuals all around the world.  
 
 
Each one of the 5 conduit OFCs is specialized in a geographical area: The United King-
dom serves as a conduit between European countries and Luxembourg, Bermuda, Jer-
sey, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands. The Netherlands is the principal conduit 
between European companies and Luxembourg, Curacao, Cyprus and Bermuda.  
Luxembourg and Hong Kong companies invest directly in European countries and 
China, without using a conduit OFC. In contrast, investments from countries typically 
identified as small tax havens (e.g., Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, or Cayman Islands) 
do use conduit OFC, and thus companies located in these jurisdictions invest in other 
OFCs (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Heemskerk and Takes 2017). 
 
 
Basically, the overall picture is that the Netherlands and Luxembourg serve the Euro-
pean countries, Hong Kong (and some other sink OFCs) serves the Asian countries, and 
instead the United Kingdom serves as an integrator between Europe and Asia. But also, 
the study shows how every country is specialized in a particular line of business: activi-
ties of head offices for Ireland and the UK, mining and quarrying in Jersey for Switzer-
land, manufacturers of electronics and computers for Hong Kong, holding companies 
for the Netherlands and Luxembourg, other financial sectors for Ireland, business sup-
port service activities for the Netherlands (concentrated in Luxembourg). Apart from 
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those lines of business Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Singapore and Ireland work strongly 
with unknown sectors that end up in sink OFCs (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Heemskerk 
and Takes 2017). 
 
 
The concept of conduit OFC was already used by Fernandez (2015) to underline the im-
portance of the role played by some EU countries in the offshore financial flows. In his 
work referring to the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland, he stated that “these loca-
tions do not harbor the higher value added services of shadow banking found in first-
tier financial centers such as New York and London, but instead provide a specialized 
service industry that facilitates pass- through entities processing large capital flows”. 
 
8.5 The EU as a source of Offshore wealth 
 
In 2015, the largest source of wealth for the OFCs was Western Europe, with references 
to the United Kingdom, Germany and France, even after declining 3% compared to the 
previous year. It is also very relevant that the United Kingdom was in the top three 
source countries together with China and the United States, but being the one with the 
highest ratio of offshore shares compared to the total wealth of the country, with an 
astonishing 6%. This number might seem small compared to areas like MEA and Latin 
America with around 25% of total private wealth held offshore, but is should be kept 
into consideration that in these regions, economic and political tensions (as well as ac-
cess to financial products not available onshore) create a totally different environment 
than the one in the UK (BCG 2015). 
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Figure 4. Source of Offshore wealth by region in 2015, Source: BCG Global Wealth Mar-
ket-Sizing Database 2016 
 
In general, in the years between 2010 and 2015 the percentage of the offshore wealth 
coming from the old world (the developed regions) has been constantly decreasing in 
favor of the new world (developing regions) that grew from 57% in 2010 to 65% in 2015. 
This was influenced also by the regulatory measures against tax evasion and money 
laundering that are being implemented in the EU, pushing them to bring back the capi-
tals onshore. Despite this the offshore wealth generated in the developed countries is 
forecasted to grow 2% annually until 2020, showing still a trend even if a less remarkable 
one compared to the annual 6% forecasted for the developing countries (BCG 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Asia Pacific 2.6
Western Europe
2.6
Middle East and 
Africa 1.9
Latin America 1.2
Eastern Europe 0.7
North America 0.7 Japan 0.1
SOURCES OF OFFSHORE WEALTH BY REGION, 2015 
(IN TRILLIONS USD) 
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9 DISCUSSION 
9.1 The services offered by the OFCs and their financial impact 
 
The findings of this thesis regarding the offshore world were multiple and mainly based 
on three areas: locations, services and financial impact.  
 
 
The OFCs market defined according to the “traditional” concept, being the so-called sink 
jurisdictions where the wealth is stored, have in The British Virgin Islands, Panama, the 
Bahamas and the Seychelles the four main players. The first has a fully dominant role in 
terms of incorporations, considering that the jurisdiction basically is responsible for half 
of the companies incorporated worldwide. 
 
 
The main attraction of the OFCs are the services or service providers they offer. The key 
ones like the limited liability vehicles, the possibility of implementing tax planning for 
companies and individuals, trusts and foundations, but also the more traditional ones 
like banks, insurances and investment funds, or more leisure related ones like ship reg-
istration, in which Panama is the main provider widely surpassing China and the US to-
gether, can offer huge benefits to all the parts involved (except the onshore countries 
treasuries) even operating in the total legality. Therefore, for the individuals or organi-
zations willing to have a higher degree of risk and with no ethical bond to legality, oper-
ating borderline or fully illegally with the OFCs, brings even bigger competitive ad-
vantages than those that are working within the borders of the law. 
 
 
The consequential financial flows are simply the representation of the advantages they 
can guarantee to their clients and partners. These activities can be legal like tax planning 
or illegal like tax evasion but in both case, they have an enormous financial impact on 
the onshore jurisdictions from individuals and even exponentially bigger ones from 
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MNCs. The yearly tax loss from individuals of 130 billion euro and of 2,6 trillion from 
MNCs add up to an astonishing 2,73 trillion euro every year. A proof of how established 
are these practices is that 80 out of the US top 100 companies have subsidiaries in an 
OFC.  
 
 
Considering the fact that those are just a part of the business practices of the OFCs, the 
offshore world plays a key role in nowadays economy and financial industry. Looking at 
the issue from an economic point of view and business volume it is no wonder that so 
many jurisdictions and main countries take part in this environment as active players 
rather than as barriers against it. 
 
9.2 The role of the EU in the offshore finance phenomenon 
 
In the second part about the role of the EU in the offshore finance industry the focus 
was on the policy approach regarding the subject and on the level of involvement as 
capital source or service provider. 
 
 
In the matter of policy making the EU has two main issues, its structure doesn’t support 
an effective fiscal environment concerning cross border taxation and on the other hand 
the interest of some member countries is more oriented towards an offshore strategy 
than against it. Even when the EU is able to implement some laws to control the flows 
the market is very fast at adapting and changing its best practices. Some results have 
been achieved but the overall view on the topic is rather pessimistic. 
 
 
The Western European area is nowadays the biggest source of offshore wealth in the 
world and in particular the UK is in the top three countries and has a relevant off-
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shore/GDP ratio considering the fact that it is a strongly developed economy. If we ex-
tend the idea of UK to British Imperial Pole (with all dependencies and recent colonies) 
the group accounts for 38,3% of the international assets, giving a very clear idea of how 
relevant and central its role is in the global economy. Also from the point of view of FDIs 
one of the main destination of European capitals is the offshore world. So, the overall 
picture shows the EU (and the UK as leader) as a great utilizer of OFCs and offshore 
services in order to manage and enlarge wealth or to do various businesses. 
 
 
From the opposite point of view providing services related to the offshore industry is a 
business in which the EU plays the role of the lion too. Advanced tax ruling, intermedia-
tion and other financial services connected see a group of EU countries (essentially UK, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Ireland) as main global players. The phenomenon is even 
more relevant if we consider the concept of conduit-OFC, where the UK is the absolute 
leader, like in most of the aspects bonded with offshore finance. Also, considering as a 
factor the offshore intensity, the top ten is dominated by commonwealth realms, prov-
ing once again the centrality of the UK in the industry and consequently of the EU, at 
least up to the final implementation of the Brexit. 
 
 
In overall it is very clear from the literature taken into consideration earlier that the EU 
is highly involved and has a central role in the world of OFCs. Despite some policy making 
that is trying to limit the phenomenon and regulate more the industry the situation is 
hardly expected to change in the short term. Both the aspects of capital source and ser-
vices provider proved to be deeply rooted in the European economy and business envi-
ronment, showing the pivotal position of the EU (or at least of some EU countries) in 
almost every data set or piece of literature. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The relevance of this paper is to be connected to a more conscious understanding of the 
world of the OFCs and to the fact that it is usually seen in the collective imagination as 
detached from the EU and relegated in minor countries in exotic locations held “ethi-
cally” and politically totally accountable for it. Instead the centrality of the EU and con-
sequently of us, Europeans, forces the acknowledgement of the situation and pushes 
towards a shift in the perception of the phenomenon. 
 
 
The work might appear to give more relevance to the aspect of the role of the EU instead 
of being well balanced also with the aspect of the overview about the world of the OFCs. 
This is due to the fact that the latter serves as a tool to enrich, contextualize and make 
more meaningful the part related to the EU but also to make the reader understand the 
reasons behind the common mistake in the perception of the offshore finance environ-
ment. It might be correct to consider the second research question (what is the role 
played by the European Union in the offshore finance phenomenon?) more relevant 
from an academic point of view and more central to the paper itself but also the first 
(what are the services offered by the main OFCs and what kind of financial impact they 
have on the world?) has its importance and works as a support in order to create a well-
rounded and decently exhaustive thesis. 
 
 
For the future, it could be interesting to re-evaluate the pivotality of the EU in the world 
of the OFCs once the UK will finally implement the Brexit in its totality. This because of 
its leading role in most of the data sets and pieces of literature regarding the topic. A 
new union without the UK might end up with a lot smaller degree of involvement in the 
offshore finance world, twisting so totally the output of this thesis and the considera-
tions of the author.  
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